



# Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection



Connecticut Department of  
**ENERGY &  
ENVIRONMENTAL  
PROTECTION**

# Harborview Training and Research Facility Cs-137 Release Incident

October 27, 2021  
Mike Firsick  
Fall Meeting of the  
NEHLRWTF



Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

# Disclaimer



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# Harborview Incident

Why Discuss This Incident Here?

What's the Applicability to the HLRWTTF?

Who Was Involved?



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# Applicability To NTSF

- Transportation of Radioactive Material
- US DOT
- DOE
- NRC
- State
- City/Town
- Government Contractors



# The Incident


- May 2, 2019
- Part of NNSA's Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP)
- Remove 2900 Curies of Cs-137 from the Harborview Research and Training Facility in Seattle, Wa.
- Required Removal of Source from Source Holder





## Residential Apartments and Condos

Children's  
Facility



HMC  
Emergency



Hospital  
Operating  
Rooms

Interstate 5

ICP

Hilltop  
Retirement Home


HRT



Cesium-137 decay chain






Cesium Chloride




- 1,000 R/hr @ 1 m from an unshielded 2900 Ci source
- Exceed occupational 5 rem limit in 20 s
  - Exceed Emerg 25 rem limit in 1 minute
  - Onset of Radiation Sickness (100 rem) in 6 minutes

@ 1 ft onset of radiation sickness in ½ minute







### 1600 Source moved from basement to loading dock

- Irradiator to MHC misaligned
- No donut shield
- Source holder modified with hacksaw (not in procedure)

### 1830 Prejob Brief

- 3 untrained techs getting OJT
- Observers from DOH and FBI not present and no dosimetry
- No rad access restrictions
- Higher than expected radiation

### 1900 Start cutting

- No swipe surveys
- No air samples
- No rad barriers
- Doors not closed

### 1930 Extra cuts to free source

- Fewer sparks
- Camera bright sparks
- Source most likely breached

### 2100 Changing Roles



- DOH and FBI leave
- RCT goes to buy batteries
- Rigger taking dose rates

### 2127 "Source may have been breached"

- Falls apart in MHC
- Frisker pegged >500,000 cpm
- RSO notified
- NRC HOO called 2200



# 27 Cuts Later...









Immediate  
Response May 2-3

- SFD HAZMAT
- WA DOH
- UW
- CST
- REAC/TS

Post Event  
Response May 3-5

- UW
- DOE RAP

Post Event  
Recovery May 6-12

- UW
- Chase  
Environmental

Unified Command  
May 13


- UW
- DOE
- NIT






## ROOFTOP SURVEY RESULTS


Data as of 5/23/2019, 1500 PDT

CMHT  
R&T BUILDING CONTAMINATION INCIDENT  
SEATTLE, WA









[Health](#) | [Local News](#) | [Nation](#) | [Northwest](#)

## 13 exposed to radioactive material at UW research site near Seattle's Harborview Medical Center


May 3, 2019 at 7:12 am | Updated May 3, 2019 at 6:38 pm



By [Ryan Blethen](#)   
*Seattle Times staff reporter*

The spill of a radioactive substance at a loading dock of a University of Washington Medicine research building on First Hill left 13 people exposed to

- Failure to perform a radiological risk assessment or develop an adequate plan with contingencies
  - Removing a source from a sealed source holder with high speed cutting tools without positive contamination controls should never have been performed
  - Multiple missed Stop Work opportunities
  - First time evolution with trainees
- Overreliance on Appeal to Authority
  - Unclear roles and responsibilities



- Stop the release
  - No JHA or contingency plan
  - Encapsulation without oversight
- Warn Others
  - SFD not aware of the evolution
  - Believe your meters
- Isolate the Area
  - Ventilation not shutdown or understood
  - Doors remained open
  - No radiation or contamination postings
  - Observers had unencumbered access
- Minimize the spread of contamination
  - MHC did not provide positive confinement
  - No contingency plan
  - People allowed in contaminated areas
  - No swipe or air samples
  - Techs remained in contaminated area after breach
- Survey and Cleanup
  - Need for Radiological expertise in response and recovery – ROSS
  - Underestimated spread
  - Prompt assessment of internal contamination



# HHCC Source Removal



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# HHCC Source Removal




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# HHCC Source Removal



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# Questions?

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